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FAITH AND THE LIBERAL LEGAL ORDER:
AN APPRECIATIVE RESPONSE TO
SHAFFER AND THE
SYMBOLISM WORKSHOP
Elizabeth Mensch*
W"HEN lawyers of faith gather together, they tend to long for
some version of the fides of the High Middle Ages. Fides was
that single word which once meant, simultaneously, "belief" in God,
"fidelity" in marriage, and "fealty" within the legal, economic, and
political hierarchy.' At least at the level of aspiration, all those rela-
tionships, now so disparate, were once joined by fides into a single
harmonious whole within which, ontologically, human virtues and
human laws were linked to the laws of nature and nature's God.2
While we cannot return to the fides a bygone era, nor to the episte-
mology which made it possible, we seem nevertheless to yearn for at
least some sense of natural congruence between the public life of the
law and a life of faith, which today's dominant culture so relentlessly
labels private.
That yearning was evident at the Conference. Nevertheless, Tom
Shaffer's keynote speech3 contained a potentially jarring message of
radical disruption and discontinuity, not of harmonious, integrated
wholeness. His proposed model for our reflection and imitation was
not the integrative legalism of the High Middle Ages, but the subver-
sively nonviolent Anabaptist communities of the radical Reforma-
tion.4 The Anabaptists, of course, never posed the question now so
typical of modern liberal religious pathos: "How can we show that we
are relevant to the legal and political order?" Nor did they aggres-
sively pursue the opportunity to wield coercive legal and political
power, in the manner of so many Christians since the reign of Con-
stantine. Both liberal pathos and political aggression presuppose the
natural inevitability of the violently coercive legal order.
The Anabaptists were (peacefully) disruptive because they rejected
precisely that presupposition. The radical wing of the Reformation
understood-as Shaffer insisted-that when viewed through the lens
of faith, the coercive nature of all law backed by the power of the state
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1. See John T. Noonan, Jr., The Believer and the Powers That Are 36 (1987).
2. See Steven Ozment, The Age of Reform 1250-1550, at 22-32 (1980).
3. Thomas L. Shaffer, Faith Tends to Subvert Legal Order, 66 Ford. L Rev. 1089
(1998).
4. Id. at 1090-96.
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necessarily presents an initial problem of radical discontinuity.5 Law-
yers, accustomed to the assumed legitimacy of the modern nation
state, start from the opposite vantage point-that of the legalist for
whom religion poses a "problem," which must be handled within the
framework of constitutional law. Thus, even lawyers of faith might
find themselves thinking of the American legal and political order as
their analytic starting point: One's own faith then becomes the prob-
lem. Shaffer reminded us that when faith forms the initial premise,
the lens through which the world is viewed, then the coercive legal
order itself becomes the problem.6
Moreover, by insisting that the scripture of the Abrahamic faiths
holds out an alternative model and promise of uncoerced shalom,
Shaffer attacked the foundational premise of legal analysis itself, the
premise of an inevitable conflict which can be contained only by way
of coerced legal mediation.7 The radically subversive communal prac-
tices of the Anabaptists were radical and subversive because the
Anabaptists denied that premise, and constructed whole communities
where the learned practice of forgiveness replaced state coercion. In
addition, they actively demonstrated that a life lived freely for the
(forgiven) other was not a life lived in the competitive pursuit of gain
and privatized comfort. For that reason, as Shaffer boldly suggested,
there may be more than a little resonance between Marxist and Chris-
tian critiques of capitalism.8
As the Conference moved on, Shaffer's Anabaptists tended to drop
from view, although there were occasional mentions of a pesky anti-
nomian strain in Christian thought-a strain which, from some faith
perspectives, is either perverse or simply incomprehensible.9 Other-
5. Id. at 1090-92.
6. Id. at 1092-94. In Robert Cover's stark words, "[l]egal interpretation takes
place in a field of pain and death." Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale
L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986). While law and polity may be ordained by God, as a tragic
necessity in a fallen world, the emphasis must always be on "tragic." See also Shaffer,
supra note 3, at 1092-93.
For a criminal law scholar's argument that the justification of law's violent reality
should be recognized as the central problem for legal analysis, see Markus Dirk Dub-
ber, The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise in Modern Penal Thought,
16 L. & Hist. Rev. 113 (1998), especially 159-162.
7. See Shaffer, supra note 3, at 1094.
8. See id. 1098-99. For an argument that a transformative model of communal
life, as well as, specifically, a critique of an "acquisitive culture," can be located within
Jewish scripture, see Walter Brueggemann, Interpretation and Obedience: From
Faithful Reading to Faithful Living 12-14 (1991).
9. See John Winthrop, A Short Story of the Rise, Reign and Ruine of the Antino-
mians, Familists and Libertines, in David D. Hall, The Antinomian Controversy (2d
ed. 1990). Of course, the "heretical" Antinomians had a good deal of influence on
American Church/State doctrine, by way of Roger Williams. See Perry Miller, Roger
Williams: His Contribution to the American Tradition (1953); Noonan, supra note 1,
at 61-71. For the importance of Williams's "wall of separation between the garden of
the church and the wilderness of the world" imagery, see Noonan, supra note 1, at 66,
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wise, the search at the Conference was, for the most part, a search for
continuity, not disruption.
Shaffer's message contains a special urgency, however. Intellectual
confidence in the liberal Enlightenment's model of the autonomous
individual self, enjoying rights protected by a neutral legal order, has
been steadily eroding, and with it has eroded the legal order's under-
lying claim to legitimacy. If, as Shaffer argued, the true faith commu-
nity is subversive to the modem legal order, so too are the most
vigorous intellectual currents now abroad in the land. Within that cur-
rent postmodernist, essentially Nietszchian, context, the "difference"
faith holds out might be viewed as a source of (disruptive) hope."
The particular Anabaptist model Shaffer described can hardly be
startling to lawyers, given the well-known case of Wisconsin v.
Yoder," where the Old Order Amish successfully won exemption
from the state's compulsory education law for Amish children past
eighth grade.' In Yoder, the legal system directly confronted religion
as a radically different praxis, as a model of "communal subversive
acts." In Chief Justice Burger's oft-cited elegiac description, the Old
Order Amish, following the tradition of the Anabaptists,
return to the early, simple, Christian life de-emphasizing material
success, rejecting the competitive spirit, and seeking to insulate
themselves from the modem world .... The high school tends to
emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinc-
tion, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other stu-
dents. Amish society emphasizes informal learning-through-doing;
a life of "goodness," rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather
than technical knowledge; community welfare, rather than competi-
tion; and separation from, rather than integration with, contempo-
rary worldly society.' 3
In justifying the exception, the Chief Justice could also point to an
element of historical continuity with early American farming life, and
to the law-abiding record of the Old Order Amish. 4 He seemed at
pains, in fact, implicitly to separate the Amish from other counter-
and Milner S. Ball, Lying Down Together. Law, Metaphor, and Theology 23-27
(1985).
10. See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason 278-
379 (1990) (discussing the relation between Christian theology and postmodernism).
For a discussion of theology as a narrative tradition needing no modem, foundational-
ist premises, and hence at home in a postliberal, postmodern culture, see George A.
Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age
(1984). See also Ronald Thieman, Constructing a Public Theology: The Church in a
Pluralistic Culture 126-41 (1991) (suggesting the construction of a theology without
foundationalist presuppositions). For a discussion of the same issues in the context of
Jewish law, see Ze'ev W. Falk, Jewish Religious Law in the Modern (and Postmodern)
World, 11 J.L. & Religion 465 (1994-95).
11. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
12. Id. at 234.
13. Id. at 210-11.
14. Id. at 210-13.
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cultural forces then running rampant. By contrast to the rest of the
world in 1972, no doubt the Old Order Amish seemed reassuringly
quaint.
Justice Douglas, quite properly, refused to be similarly beguiled.' 5
If freedom meant the Enlightenment's promised freedom of the au-
tonomous self, the bearer of rights as protected by the neutrality of
the law, then of course the Amish adolescents should have the oppor-
tunity to attend school. 6 Amish communal practice (or indoctrina-
tion, as Justice Douglas seemed to imply) precluded precisely those
cultural and economic choices which American culture otherwise of-
fered as legally protected rights. For Justice Douglas, moreover, the
case highlighted and clarified a lurking and related question: Within
the terms of liberal legalism, the only religious freedom that the Court
could coherently and consistently protect was freedom as the right to
(private) belief, not (public) religious practice. 7 Here Justice Douglas
was in accord with the Enlightenment model of toleration advanced
by Locke 8 and Jefferson, 19 if not necessarily by Madison.20 His basic
approach is also consistent with the Court's current Free Exercise
jurisprudence.2
Yoder is a pivotal case because the question was so clearly one in
which a whole social practice was at odds with Enlightenment presup-
positions. Religious practice, for the Amish, meant more than cere-
monial practice. It meant life lived with an alternative inner
orientation of the "self" which could only be learned and realized in a
community formed by a practiced, narrative conformity to Biblical
sources and Biblical promise. The purely autonomous self Justice
Douglas sought to protect was, for the Amish, an incoherent construct
(as it now is in the postmodernist literature as well); so too were the
15. Id. at 241-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
16. See id. at 245-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 247 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
18. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), in 6 The Works of John
Locke 1, at 44-45 (photo. reprint 1963) (1823). Essentially, the magistrate determines
what will and will not be permitted. Id. Michael McConnell argues that Locke's for-
mulation rendered religious freedom even more vulnerable than other rights. See
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1434 n.134 (1990).
19. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 159 (William Peden ed.,
1982) (1785) ("The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are
injurious to others."). Here Jefferson clearly (and snidely) distinguishes belief, about
which the polity can be indifferent, and acts, which can harm others.
20. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
(1785), in The Complete Madison: His Basic Writings 299, 300 (Saul K. Padover ed.,
1953); see also McConnell, supra note 18, at 1452-55.
21. See e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (upholding a "neutral" prohibition on drug use, despite burden imposed on
religion, as applied to Native American ceremonial use of peyote); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
and reaffirming Smith's low level scrutiny as the operative Constitutional standard).
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distinction between belief and practice, and the parallel distinction be-
tween private and public. "Forgiveness," for example, is meaningless
as a "belief' without practice; for the Amish, forgiveness cannot be a
purely private option available as a legally-protected, subjective value
choice, since it is the very basis of their community life. Thus, Justice
Douglas, not without reason, feared the coercive aspect of Amish
training, and wanted to protect the "rights" of young Amish adoles-
cents. Nowhere, however, is the hidden coercion implicit in the pro-
tection of rights more apparent than in the state's effort to coerce the
Amish children into attending a public school, for the sake, paradoxi-
caly, of their own freedom. Here the supposed absolute freedom and
power of the individual, Enlightenment self confronts the power of
the state, and finds its own (Hobbesian) mirror image. The Old Order
Amish in Yoder inserted themselves between the state and the individ-
ual, disrupting their strangely symbiotic oppositional relationship, and
thereby challenging the model itself. The Amish prevailed, one sus-
pects, only because of brilliant lawyering by William Bentley Ball, and
because of a Chief Justice's nostalgia for gentler times-times for
which the relatively static cultural practices of the Old Order Amish
were an unthreatening reminder.
If, as Shaffer suggests, a faith community must ultimately find itself
at odds with the underlying premises of the supposedly neutral, secu-
lar legal order, then the legal model of neutrality in the protection of
religious rights will at some point show signs of incoherence, strain,
and breakdown. One such "sign" might be the oft-noted tendency of
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause claims toward revers-
ibility-the tendency for free exercise claims to give rise to Establish-
ment Clause problems, and for enforcement of the Establishment
Clause to raise free exercise problems.' Any free exercise exemption
to an otherwise impartial law is "non-neutral" with respect to religion.
Thus Justice Stevens, in City of Boerne v. Flores, stated directly that
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act's protection of "free" reli-
gious exercise was unconstitutional on Establishment Clause grounds
alone, since it mandated exemptions for religious groups (e.g., to the
zoning regulations at issue in the case) that were unavailable to atheist
or agnostic groups.' The Symbolism Workshop at the Conference
discussed a number of cases where blanket prohibitions going to garb
in the courtroom (e.g., headgear) might be lifted for the sake of reli-
gious garb. 4 Arguably, such exemptions would reveal the same fatal
lack of strict neutrality.
22. See Norman Redlich et al., Constitutional Law 1527 (3d ed. 1996) (reflecting
on the Establishment Clause as both protecting and undercutting free exercise).
23. 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring).
24. See Report of Working Group #8, 66 Ford. L Rev. 1631, 1632 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter Report #8]; see also Samuel J. Levine, Religious Symbols and Religious Garb in the
Courtroom" Personal Values and Public Judgments, 66 Ford. L Rev. 1505, 1506-13
(1998).
1998] 1561
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More interesting questions emerge from Establishment Clause
cases where free exercise rights are potentially burdened. For exam-
ple, in Roberts v. Madigan,25 a Bible visible on an elementary school
classroom desk raised Establishment Clause concerns that could be
handled only by (non-neutrally) disfavoring the Bible as compared to
other books, thereby interfering with the teacher's free exercise. 6 As
we discussed in the Workshop, a judge who keeps religious symbols in
her courtroom raises a similar problem.2 7 Even where the Establish-
ment Clause questions have been clearly decided and the law seems
unambiguous, as with officially mandated school prayer, countless
communities across the country feel that their religious "rights" have
been violated by Engel v. Vitale. 8 Constitutional guidelines are rou-
tinely ignored, and actual public school practices are a good deal more
variable than one would ever suppose from casebook law. As we dis-
cussed at length during the Workshop, there may often be more than a
little wisdom in not interfering with a relatively cohesive, homogene-
ous community whose public symbols or school practices violate the
Establishment Clause. Rigor in the enforcement of "freedom,"
viewed from another perspective, might simply be naked coercion.
Although less often noted, strikingly parallel dilemmas emerge
from the perspective of religious adherents who seek public expres-
sion of their faith, and run the consequent danger of either desecra-
tion or idolatry. It is one of the great ironies of Religion Clause
jurisprudence that the Christmas creche in Lynch v. Donnelly2 9 passed
Constitutional muster because it was so thoroughly tasteless and so
obviously geared to encouraging a binge of holiday consumerism-a
Pyrrhic victory for any sincere Christian, as Justice Blackmun's dissent
pointed out.3" Similarly, the extended LaRocca proceedings in the
New York courts, discussed in our Workshop, concerned an attorney/
priest's "right" to wear clerical garb while defending a client.3 ' At one
point, the New York Supreme Court opined that the priest should in-
deed be allowed to wear that garb, but only because priestly garb no
longer carries much moral weight anyway: Because priests no longer
command the respect and trust once accorded them, the religious sym-
25. 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990).
26. Id. at 1055-56.
27. See Butler-Brust, supra note 24, at 1631 ; see also Levine, supra note 24, at
152440.
. 28. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The Court in Engel held that state officials may not com-
pose an official state prayer and require that it be recited in state public schools, even
if the prayer is non-denominational and neutral. Id. at 424.
29. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
30. Id. at 726-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. See Levine, supra note 24, at 1515-21. The classic case on religious garb is, of
course, Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), where the Court refused to find
a free exercise exemption for the wearing of a yarmulke while in military uniform.
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bolism is without significance and would not sway a jury.32 Like the
creche in Lynch, to be acceptable a religious symbol must lose its
force.
Similarly, one might have argued that the real problem with the in-
sipid school prayer in Engel lay in the Regents' obvious use of prayer
for the purpose of instilling patriotism. 3 3 So too, in the contentions
and protracted debate over the courtroom display of the Ten Com-
mandments in Alabama Freethought Association v. Moore,' some of
us were more troubled by the arguably idolatrous use of scripture to
give religious sanction to legal proceedings, than by the implicit state
endorsement of religion. 5
On the other hand, to strip insistently the legal system of all refer-
ence to theological roots is to deny history.36 Even the Enlightenment
model itself represents a complex reconfiguration of constructs whose
origins were theological. 7 Moreover, the process of (ahistorical)
stripping of religion from law forces the individual adherent, once
again, into the implicit concession that religion is a private matter of
belief, with no legitimate relevance to one's public occupational prac-
tice. In other words, between the stark dualities the Enlightenment
model holds out-state/individual, public/private-the serious adher-
ent has no coherent place to locate herself.
An insistently communal life of serious religious practice therefore
becomes, virtually by definition, subversive to the Enlightenment le-
galist model. Interposed as a mediating structure between the abso-
lute freedom of the individual and the absolute power of the state,
religion defies law's claim to be the only possible mediator of conflict.
It does so not by falsely pretending "neutrality" in the coercive man-
agement of inevitable social conflict, but by holding out a wholly alter-
native (and not at all neutral) promise of shalom.
None of this is meant to suggest that any particular case has been
wrongly decided. On the whole, in fact, the American system's com-
bination of separation with toleration could be far worse, veering off
into oppressive, dispirited religous establishment and/or outright, se-
lective prohibition. The point is about incongruence. As Shaffer sug-
gested, religion has a persistently disruptive tendency to call into
32. People v. Rodriquez, 424 N.Y.S.2d 600, 603-605 (Sup. Ct. 1979); see also Le-
vine, supra note 24, at 1519-20.
33. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962).
34. 893 F. Supp. 1522, 1525 (N.D. Ala. 1995); see Report #8, supra note 24, at 1631;
Levine, supra note 24, at 1533-36.
35. Discussion in Working Group #8, June 3, 1997.
36. For an example of an historical work which now has become a classic on the
relation between religion and law, see Harold Berman, Law and Revolution: The
Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (1983).
37. For discussion of the complexity of those changes and interrelationships see,
e.g., Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (1989), and Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue:
A Study in Moral Theory (2d ed. 1984).
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question the basic presuppositions of the liberal legal order, and the
legal order, when it attempts to "handle" religion in a conscientiously
neutral manner, finds itself reduced to conceptual incoherence.
This incoherence, as noted already, hardly comes as a surprise in
these postmodernist times. The story told by the Enlightenment, the
story of the autonomous self protected by a rational and neutral legal
order, has already lost its hold for many. As a number of theologians
have argued, the demise of the Enlightenment opens a space for the-
ology, especially for theology conceived as an ongoing narrative tradi-
tion within which belief and practice collapse into each other. 8
Nevertheless, the space opened by postmodernism can easily be fil-
led instead by the allure of the market. Shaffer failed to fully credit
the extraordinary intellectual and cultural power of market capitalism,
with its unbounded capacity to appeal to the self as the situs of ever-
expanding and ever-more playful desire. In the market, postmodern-
ism's oft-feared relativity of value finds a welcoming home: Unlike
Marxism, postmodernism assumes no foundational reality from which
to critique capitalism as mere "ideology."
Theologians who embrace postmodernism also tend to underesti-
mate the extraordinary force of postmodernism's own mythos-the
Nietzschian mythos of power. Against the compelling postmodernist
depiction of social life as the inevitable interplay of diffuse power rela-
tions, Shaffer dared to propose that a counter-narrative could be told,
in history, through communal practice. It is a narrative about the
promise of shalom rather than the exercise of power-and, also, nec-
essarily, about the (Augustinian) reorientation of desire itself. It is
not, these days, an easy story to tell.39
38. See, e.g., Lindbeck, supra note 10. Stanley Hauerwas, a well-known postliberal
theologian, has an emphasis like Shaffer's on the coercive state as a "problem" for
theology, and on narrative communal practice. See Stanley Hauerwas, Dispatches
from the Front: Theological Engagements with the Secular (1994). For Hauerwas
specifically on the public/private question, see After Christendom?: How the Church
is to Behave if Freedom, Justice, and a Christian Nation are Bad Ideas 58-68 (1991).
The influence of John Howard Yoder, whose Politics of Jesus: Vicit Agnus Noster
(1972) has become classic, is evident in any discussion of these themes. For a tribute
to Yoder following his death last December, see Michael G. Cartwright, Radical Cath-
olicity: Reflections on the Life and Work of Theologian John Howard Yoder, The
Christian Century, Jan. 21, 1998, at 44.
39. For an extraordinary elaboration of these themes in depth, see John Milbank,
supra note 10.
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